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Abstract
This paper studies how the underlying factors that determine an individual’s
wage changes over their life-cycle, how these factors change at different education
levels, and when a worker makes job-to-job moves. Using a longitudinal matched
employer-employee data set from the Portuguese Ministry of Labor; I find that
human capital accumulation and job mobility play an important role in wage growth
during the beginning of an individual’s career. More specifically, I find that after
20 years of work wages increase, on average 41%. A large fraction of the returns
to labor market experience is rooted in the returns to general training (25%) but
sorting into better paying firms and job/titles is responsible for a significant 19%
and 10% of the returns to labor market experience, respectively. Job-to-job mobility
also enhances life-cycle earning (14%), as does the ability of the worker (32%).
Keywords: labor market experience, fixed effects, wages, Portugal
1 Introduction
The labor market is one of the most complex but fundamental parts of our economy.
As such, a great deal of literature has gone into grasping a better understanding of its
mechanisms. At the heart of the field, lies the transaction of a worker’s time for monetary
gain, a wage. It is well established that firms pay differing wages to different workers.
One of the prevailing explanations is that experience accrued as a worker spends time in
the labor market has a large role to play in the matter.
The present study intends to shed some light on the question: ”how the factors that
go into determining a worker’s wage change over their life-cycle?”. I am interested in
looking into how the underlying factors that determine an individual’s wage change over
their life-cycle, at distinct education levels, and when a worker makes job-to-job moves
(meaning the worker has no unemployment spells between jobs). These added dimensions
will give us a richer insight into the role that these factors play over the life-cycle.
In order to gain the most accurate possible picture of the inner workings of the mech-
anisms at work, I intend to apply an approach that has yet to be used in the study of
life-cycle wages. This consists of implementing three-way high-dimension fixed effects (an
extension of the fixed effects from Abowd et al. (1999)) and a decomposition proposed by
Gelbach (2016), producing an unambiguous allocation of wages into its worker, firm, and
job-title components. This approach will be applied on a dataset from the Portuguese
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Ministry of Labor, a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee data set, enabling me
to adequately tackle the question at hand.
In the Portuguese labor market, on average, the return on experience is 34.5 log points
for 20 years of labor market experience (or simply experience), which is equal to a 41%
increase1. I break down this return into the contributions of firm sorting; job sorting;
worker’s traits; and human capital, which encompasses on-the-job training. My results
also show that as an individual gains experience the main driving force that increases
their wage in the first five years of their career is the knowledge they are gaining on-
the-job. However, I also show that this effect attenuates significantly after a relatively
short period of time. Furthermore, I show that a large part of the returns to experience
are accrued in the beginning of an individuals working life. On the education front, my
results indicate that the most educated workers have consistently higher returns than the
rest. However, if we look at less educated individuals, we can observe that individuals
with less than or equal to 4 years of schooling receive higher returns to experience than
those with less than or equal to 12 years. Furthermore, I find that the differentiation of
the education levels happens before the tenth year of labor market experience, and the
benefits of higher levels of schooling is mainly felt early on in the career. With regards
to job-to-job mobility, I show that after the third job, the effect of job mobility declines,
becoming somewhat constant, meaning that returns to job mobility drop to almost zero.
The thesis continues as follows. The following section discusses some of the theoretical
foundations that are in the field and relevant existing literature. Sections 3 and 4 go into
the model, methodologies and the respective data used. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results, and section 6 concludes and suggests further research.
2 Life-Cycle Wages
In this section we will quickly skim over some of the reasons why workers’ wages differ
over time, in particular: sorting, job shopping, job matching, human capital accumulation,
aggregate effects, and peer effects.
1To convert from log point differences to percentages, I simply use the formula % = e(∆log) − 1.
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Beginning with sorting, which entails either the worker or the firm trying to find the
best possible employer-employee match, according to their respective expectations. An
example in which this may affect the worker’s lifetime wages comes from the fact that
whenever an employee quits and is replaced, the firm incurs training, processing, and
other turnover costs. As such, the firm wishes to hire applicant with a low propensity to
quit. Salop and Salop (1976) outline a way in which a firm may discourage high turnover
individuals from applying and encourages low turnover workers to apply for employment.
They suggest a firm predictably increase an employees wage with their tenure at the firm.
Salop and Salop (1976) argue that, in essence, this causes the applicant to guarantee their
longevity with the firm, since they themselves pay the consequences, in terms of foregone
higher earnings, if they quit prematurely. In other words, the guarantee enables the firm
to trust the applicants protestations that they are a steady and stable worker, at the same
time that it makes the firm relatively indifferent to the truth, since the firm no longer
bears the onus of being wrong. An employer might find an under-pay-now, over-pay-later
compensation plan attractive because of the type of workers likely to sort themselves into
their applicant pool.2
Moving on to human capital accumulation. We observe that more productive workers
will fetch a higher wage. However, how workers become more productive is a more inter-
esting question in and of itself. There are two main ways in which a worker can increase
their own productivity through learning. The first is through conventional education,
the second is through on-the-job training (itself subdivided into general and job-specific
knowledge).2
Topel (1991) offers us two explanations as to how tenure affects wage. His first ex-
planation is that productivity rise with seniority, while the other is that tenure merely
acts as a proxy for the quality of the job. In contrast, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) pose
that if there is growth of quality of jobs because of better matches across time, then this
growth causes a downward bias in the estimated returns to tenure. Altonji and Williams
(2005) provide a revision of the theory and re-estimate the returns to job seniority. They
2 For more information, I refer to Ehrenberg et al. (2016)
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estimate the effect to be 10 years of tenure to be 11 log points. Buchinsky et al. (2010)
come to the conclusion that as seniority increases, the cumulative return for the least
educated rises by more than for the highly educated. This is because for the less educated
individuals who stay in their job, and hence accumulate higher seniority, the main source
of human capital is job specific.
On-the-job training can occur through learning by doing, formal training programs
at or away from the workplace, or by informally working under the tutelage of a more
experienced worker (which we will see later). From the perspective of workers, training
depresses wages during the learning period but allows them to rise with enhanced produc-
tivity afterward. Thus, workers who opt for jobs that require a training investment are
willing to accept lower wages in the short run to get higher pay later on. As with other
human capital investments, returns are generally larger when the post-investment period
is longer, so we would expect workers’ investments in on-the-job training to be greatest
at younger ages and to fall gradually as they grow older.2 Bartel and Borjas (1981) show
that if the worker chooses to invest in on-the-job training, his or her future earnings po-
tential can be enhanced. Workers become less willing to invest in human capital as they
age and, as such, the yearly increases in potential earnings become smaller and smaller.
The acquisition of on-the-job training allows more complex tasks to be performed, or the
upward filtering of talented workers as firms discover and promote their ablest workers.
There is a case to be made that ability plays a key role in human capital accumulation,
and shapes wages over the life-cycle. Ability to learn rapidly shortens the training period,
and fast learners probably also experience lower psychic costs (lower levels of frustration)
during training. Thus, people who have the ability to learn quickly are those most likely
to seek out and be presented by employers with training opportunities. However, these
fast learners are most likely the people who, because of their abilities, were best able to
reap benefits from formal schooling. The tendency of better-educated workers to invest
more in on-the-job training explains why their age/earnings profiles start low, rise quickly,
and keep rising after the profiles of their less-educated counterparts have leveled off. Their
earnings rise more quickly because they are investing more heavily in job training, and
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they rise for a longer time for the same reason. In other words, people with the ability to
learn quickly select the ultimately high-paying jobs where much learning is required and
thus put their abilities to greatest advantage.
As mentioned above, a worker can gain human capital through their peers. Contact
between workers enables an environment that fosters the exchange of ideas and learning
by doing. This idea sharing is one of the spillovers of education as less educated workers
learn from the more educated ones. We see this as, for example, college graduates bring
in new knowledge which can benefit other workers (Rauch (1993) was one of the first to
empirically study the existence of spillover effects in education). As a worker spends more
time in the labor market, there will be more opportunity for them to come into contact
with a larger number of more knowledgeable coworkers, and thus gain more from this
spillover effect.
Job shopping refers to the search for a suitable job when workers cannot perfectly
predict either their performance in (or their liking for) a particular job. From the worker’s
point of view, these gaps in their own skill causes an inability to predict job returns -
both generally across all jobs, or specific to a particular job. Such theories typically
assume that the characteristics of potential offers can be ascertained by the worker by
searching (or search good), while Johnson (1978) assumes that some characteristics cannot
be known without actual employment experience (or experience good). There exists an
educational component important to job shopping, namely the function of education in
giving workers information about their abilities. It is plausible to assume that education
acts, much like a first job, to narrow the uncertainty a worker feels about their own
abilities, which in turn should reduce the role of learning about abilities on-the-job. As
such job shopping helps workers find the job in which they will be most productive and
have the greatest chance of earning higher wages throughout their lives. Jovanovic (1979)
builds a model exploiting this argument. Furthermore, the model also predicts that each
workers separation probability is a decreasing function of his job tenure. This is because
a mismatch between a worker and his employer is likely to be detected early on rather
than late.
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Job search also plays a role in shaping a worker’s wage over their lifetime, as such we
will take a closer look into how it does this. Christensen et al. (2005) explain that since
job openings occur more or less randomly over time, during any one period in which a
worker is on the market, not all potentially attractive openings exist. As time passes,
however, jobs open up and workers have a chance to decide whether to apply. Those who
have spent more time in the labor market have had more chances to acquire better offers
and thus improve upon their initial job matches.
The costs of on-the-job search offers one explanation why we observe that, in general,
workers’ wages improve the longer they are active in the labor market. Workers can be
viewed as wanting to obtain the best match possible but finding that there is a cost to
getting better matches (Shimer and Smith (2000)). Those who see their jobs as a poor
match have more incentives to search for other offers than do workers who are lucky
enough to already have good matches (high wages). Over time, as the unlucky workers
have more opportunity to acquire offers, matches for them should improve. Burdett
(1978) puts it succinctly: Older workers in the present study receive higher wage rates,
on average, because they have obtained more job offers. And the more job offers a worker
receives, the greater the probability a ‘high’ wage rate job will be found.
With all this being said, Lagakos et al. (2018) argue that frictions in the match making
process greatly affect the plausibility of some of these theories. If frictions to search and
matching lower the incentives or ability of workers to shop for jobs, they are less likely to
climb the job ladder and will forgo some of the potential increase in labor productivity
over the life cycle. Alternatively, long-lasting frictions may prevent workers from sorting
to the jobs that are most suitable to their heterogeneous skills and tastes. Again, the
implication would be that workers forgo labor productivity increases as they age.
From some of the already mentioned works, we can see the impact of job mobility on
wages. Buchinsky et al. (2010) conclude that the timing of a move in a career matters.
Early moves being most beneficial to college educated workers whereas late moves can be
very detrimental for workers with lower education. Short spells can sometimes be good,
and other times be bad. Mobility through the wage distribution is achieved through
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a combination of wage increases within the firm and across firms. The former is more
important for wage growth of high school dropouts because of their lower returns to
experience. The latter is more important for college graduates, because both returns to
experience and seniority are quite large. Later, Borovicˇkova´ and Shimer (2017) find that
the correlation between a worker’s type and their employer’s type is quite high, lying
between 0.4 and 0.5 and is reasonably stable over time. One interpretation of the results
is that workers gradually sort over the life cycle. At the start of their careers, there is a
lot of uncertainty about a workers’ type and so sorting is imperfect. As the worker grows
older, the market learns the worker’s type and the best workers sort into the best jobs.
We will now turn to the aggregate effects that change a worker’s wage over their life-
cycle. Over a worker’s lifetime there is an advancement in technology this effect is even
more accentuated in the last century- making tasks easier and workers more productive.
Although this is true across the entire labor market, we can argue that the worker is more
productive than a younger version of themselves, and as such will fetch a higher wage.
I will rely in the works of Altonji et al. (2013) as a starting point. Their main results
are: first, they conclude that job changes are induced by high outside offers and deterred
by the job-specific wage component of the current job, which is consistent with job search
theory. Second, wages are highly persistent. This persistence is the combination of the
effects of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the job-specific wage component,
which depends positively on offers in previous jobs, and strong persistence in representing
the value of the worker’s general skills. Third, the variance and mean of earnings changes
are greatly affected by shocks leading to job changes. Finally, that job-shopping, the
accumulation of tenure, and the growth in general skills account for log point wage in-
creases of 13, 11, and 61, respectively, over the first 30 years in the labor market. Finally,
they find that job mobility plays a key role in the variance of career earnings. Variables
determined by the first year of employment, including unobserved heterogeneity, educa-
tion, and initial draws of the general skill and job-specific wage components, collectively
account for 44.6% of lifetime wages.
This goes to show that, although economists can come to the consensus that part of
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the variation in the prices of goods is due to factors other than marginal cost, the notion
that wages differ substantially among equally skilled workers remains highly controversial.
3 Empirical Methodology
A big focus in labor economics is what determines wages, and a large amount of the
literature in this subject has focused on the relationship between education and wages.
Economists such as Mincer defend a human capital theory of education, in which they
argue education raises productivity. Mincer (1974) argues that there are more types of
investment in human capital, other than schooling, although schooling is an important
stage in the life-cycle of self-investment. Mincer states that we must take into account pre-
school (home) and post-school (job) investments in addition to schooling, when we think
of the life-cycle stages, or ways in which human capital is built up. The Mincer model was
first derived to capture the schooling rate of return on earnings (Mincer (1958)), where
individuals decided the education level that maximized the present value of their lifetime
earnings. Mincer argues that there are more types of investment in human capital, other
than schooling, one such example is vocational training (labor market experience). As
such, Mincer added the impact on earnings of investments in human capital throughout
working life. Suggesting that the proportion of earnings given to investment in human
capital decreases linearly with labor market experience, the base specification is given by:
wit = β0 + β1Sit + β2LMXit + β3LMX
2
it + β4Gi + εit (1)
where wit is the natural logarithm of wage belonging to worker i(i = 1, . . . , N) in year t(t =
1, . . . , Ti). There are Ti observations for each individual i and a total of N
∗ observations.
Sit is the level of schooling for individual i in time t. LMXit is individual i’s labor market
experience at time t, and Gi is a gender dummy for individual i; εit is an error which
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates. The use of logarithms on earnings
is consistent with both the units of investment being in time and not monetary units
(Mincer (1975)), and the accurate fit of log-linearity for the major wage distribution of
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Mincers sample. Additionally, it simplifies the interpretation of small coefficients.
Adding more complexity to the model, and as much of the literature, I will use a
variation on the additive worker and firm effects wage model proposed by Abowd et al.
(1999) also known as AKM, as it has become the benchmark for analysis in matched
(or linked) employer-employee data. In their seminal study of the French labor market,
Abowd et al. (1999) specified a model for log wages that includes additive fixed effects for
workers and firms. Specifically, their model for the log wage of person i in year t takes
the form:
wit = Xitβ + θi + φF (i,t) + εit (2)
where Xit summarizes the time-varying regressors (quadratic on labor market experience,
tenure and log of firm size), θi is the person effect capturing the (time-invariant) portable
component of earnings ability, β is a vector of coefficients for the observed characteristics
of the same individual, and φF (i,t) is the firm effect for the firm in which individual i
is working in at time t (denoted by the function F (i, t) = 1, . . . , F ). Each of the fixed
effects captures observed and unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity. The
innovation in the AKM framework is the presence of the firm effects, which allows for the
possibility that some firms pay systematically higher or lower wages than other firms. 3
Expanding on the model I have seen so far, I follow Torres et al. (2018) and allow a
flexible specification for the effect of labor market experience, and also add to the AKM
model a job-title fixed effect. Job-title effects reflect the distinct set of occupational tasks
performed by workers that serve to define occupational boundaries. Their model is as
follows:
wit = Xitβ + θi + φF (i,t) + λJ(i,t) + ξE(i,t) + δt + εit (3)
3Another, more technical issue that arises with the AKM model is appropriate specification of the
effects of age. Following Mincer (1974), it is conventional to include a polynomial in age or potential
experience in Xit. However, it is also standard to include a set of year indicators in Xit (for example,
to adjust for changing macroeconomic conditions). This raises an identification problem because age can
be computed as calendar year minus birth year. Hence, I face the problem of distinguishing additive age,
year, and cohort effects, where cohort effects are understood to load into the person effects. While the
firm effects are invariant to how age and time effects are normalized, different normalizations will yield
different values of the person effects and the covariate index. An approach to dealing with this problem
is to impose a linear restriction on the effects of age or time. Card et al. (2018) suggest substituting age
and age2 with (age− 40)2. The way in which I intend to get around this issue is to forgo calculating the
effects of age on wage, but keying into the effects of labor market experience on wage.
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where I add new variables to equation (2), the first of which is λJ(i,t), this is the job-title
fixed effect for job-title in which individual i occupies at time t (denoted by the function
J(i, t) = 1, . . . , J). ξE(i,t) is the labor market experience fixed effect for each year of labor
market experience individual i has at time t (denoted by the function E(i, t) = 1, . . . , E).
Another new addition is δt, which is a calendar year fixed effects included to capture the
macroeconomic environment (business cycle). In summary, there are seven components
that explain the wage variability:
1. the workers’ permanent heterogeneity or worker quality, θi;
2. the firms’ permanent heterogeneity or firm sorting, φF (i,t);
3. the job-titles’ permanent heterogeneity or job-title sorting, λJ(i,t);
4. the calendar years’ permanent heterogeneity or calendar year fixed effects, δt;
5. on-the-job training or human capital accumulation, ξE(i,t);
6. the time-varying characteristics, Xitβ (tenure, tenure squared, and log of firm size);
7. an error term component (εit), assumed to follow the conventional assumptions.
I am interested in using these estimates to see how they change over a worker’s life-
cycle, as such I must restrict the data set to connected observations for which compara-
bility of the estimates of the fixed effects is assured. To do this I will use the algorithm of
Weeks and Williams (1964) to identify connected observations. This algorithm identifies
a subset of the data in which all workers’ fixed effects are connected. If I restrict analysis
to this subset of the data, I assure that the estimates of the fixed effects are comparable.
Once I have the model I wish to estimate, in this case equation (3), I must then
employ an adequate method for estimation. Abowd et al. (1999) proposed a solution that
yielded an approximation to the full least squares solution of a linear regression model
with two high-dimensional fixed effects, however, this method would not be optimal as it
involves the inversion of a huge matrix. Making it impossible to achieve using standard
software routines and present-day computers. In a later paper, Abowd et al. (2002)
presented a conjugate gradient algorithm that led to the exact least squares solution,
however, they estimate models with only two fixed effects. More recently, Guimara˜es
and Portugal (2010) demonstrated that it is possible to obtain the exact least squares
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solution for linear regression models with two or more high-dimensional fixed effects with
a methodology that is based on a partitioned algorithm strategy and follows an iterative
procedure that leads to the exact solution of the least squares problem. This approach
is computationally intensive but imposes minimum memory requirements (as opposed to
the heavy memory constraints imposed in the solution given by Abowd et al. (2002)). As
such, I will use the iterative algorithm proposed by Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010).4
Now, using equation (3) and the iterative algorithm I must show how each fixed effect
contributes to wages over a worker’s life-cycle. To this end I will use a similar approach to
Cardoso et al. (2016) (in this paper the authors study the gender pay gap) and Addison
et al. (2018) (in this paper the authors study the union wage gap). In order to disentangle
the contributions of the fixed effects to the passage of time, I will use the decomposition
first suggested by Gelbach (2016) (like Cardoso et al. (2016)). Based on the formula
for omitted variable bias, Gelbach’s decomposition allows us to us to disentangle the
contribution of each excluded variable (each fixed effect) to the variation of the coefficient
estimate(s) of the labor market experience variable(s). This then quantifies the impact of
each of the fixed effects on the relationship between wages and labor market experience5.
In practice, the decomposition is achieved by estimating regressions in which the fixed
effects become the dependent variables and the regressors are those of equation (3). Then
I can provide a graphical representation of how these fixed effects affect the return to
experience.
4 Data
I will be using a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set for Portugal, known
as the Quadros de Pessoal for the years 1986 to 2009 (excepting 1990 and 2001) and from
its successor survey the Relatrio U´nico for the years 2010 to 2013. This unique dataset is
4To achieve this I will be using the STATA command ”reghdfe” written by Correia (2016)
5The way in which I define labor market experience at time t is as a sum of all the accumulated tenure
a worker has accrued up to time t - in practice this is the sum of tenure of all past and current jobs of
said worker. As a worker ages, their labor market experience will increase accordingly, if they don’t suffer
spells of unemployment. Since I am using labor market experience instead of age, what is meant behind
life-cycle wages is how wages change as a worker gains more experience.
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administered by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor, and is taken from a mandatory annual
survey 6 of all firms with at least one wage earner in the reference month - March of each
year until 1993, October thereafter. However, civil servants, self-employed, and household
employees are not covered. Furthermore, since the share of wage-earners in agriculture is
low, the coverage of this sector is low. Nonetheless, for manufacturing and the services
private sector of the economy, the survey covers virtually the entire population of workers
and firms. Due to the mandatory nature of the survey, problems commonly associated
with panel data sets, such as panel attrition, are considerably attenuated.
Turning to specifics, the data set includes the following information on each worker:
social security identifier, gender, age, level of education, occupation, employment status,
tenure, monthly earnings, normal and overtime hours, time elapsed since last promotion,
and the worker’s job-title (so-called professional category or categoria profissional). The
schooling information refers to the highest completed level of education.7 The information
on earnings includes the base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), regular benefits,
and overtime pay. The data set also includes the following information on the firms: firm
identifier, location, industry, legal form, ownership, year of formation, sales, and capital.
After some cleaning of the data (which included, removing entries with no social se-
curity number, and missing wages), I applied some restrictions to the data set. I began
by restricting the analysis to full-time (more than 120 monthly hours) workers with ages
between 25 and 54, in hopes to eliminate any selection bias into or out or the work-
force (as per Bingley and Cappellari (2018)). I dropped from the analysis workers whose
monthly wages were below 75% of the mandatory minimum wage (which corresponds to
the minimum wage for apprentices). I further dropped any worker with an experience that
suggested they began employment with the age lower than 15. As mentioned in section
4, we must restrict the data to a subset of the data in which all workers’ fixed effects
are connected. This largest connected set comprises 5,994,065 unique worker entries and
6Each year, around 300 different collective agreements are negotiated. The collective agreement defines
wage floors for each particular job-title (so-called professional category or categoria profissional). The
main reason why this survey was created was, indeed, to allow the officials from the Ministry of Labor to
verify whether the employers were complying with the wage floors established by the collective agreement
for the job-title of the worker.
7Appendix I shows how this is mirrored in the data set
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678,258 unique firm entries, for a total of 38,549,942 observations.
5 Empirical Results
I will be analyzing the results in three section. The first will encompass an overarching
view of how wages change as a worker gains experience, on average. The second will
provide an educational breakdown of how wages change through the life-cycle. In both
of the previous cases, I will use dummy variables for each year of experience in order to
analyze to intended mechanisms. The third and final section will look at job changes, and
how they affect the factors that go into determining wage. During each of the different
breakdowns we must keep in mind that we are dealing with changes in log points of real
hourly wage.
5.1 Breakdown of Entire Population
I will start off with the analysis of the population on a broader scale. Figure 1 shows both
how wages change as a worker gains experience (Figure 1a), which we can equate to the
returns to experience, and the decomposition of said returns(Figure 1b).
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(a) Returns to Experience. Both curves are normal-
ized to zero. Unconditional, regression of experience
on log wages, not controlling for any other factors.
Conditional, regression of log wages, controlling for
tenure, tenure squared, firm size, gender, education,
and calendar year fixed effects (Regression I of Ap-
pendix III)
(b) Decomposition of Returns to experience. Gelbach
decomposition of the Conditional curve of (a). Curves
normalized to zero. Showing firm, job-title, worker,
and experience contributions to returns of experience
(Regression II of Appendix III)
Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Figure 1: Graph of Returns to Experience and its Decomposition
Figure 1a shows us two curves, an unconditional curve, which represents the simple
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regression of wage on experience, and a conditional curve which represents the regression
of wage on experience with the added controls of specification (I)8 where I have controlled
for education, gender, and the calendar year. This conditional curve of figure 1a is the
same as the Total curve in figure 1b. As 23 years is the 90th percentile for experience,
I will mostly discuss the values at 20 years of experience. From Figure 1a it can be
seen that the return on experience is 34.5 log points (a two fifth increase) for 20 years of
experience.9
We can decompose this 34.5 log point return on experience into the respective con-
tributions from the firm sorting, worker quality, job-title sorting, and human capital
accumulation. Here, it is to our benefit to understand that the returns to experience of,
say firm sorting represents the log point increase in real hourly wage that would occur
if individuals were equally paid across firms regardless of experience, conditional on all
other variables included in the full model.10 We can see that firm sorting accounts for 6.6
log points (approximately one fifth of the return to experience); job-title sorting accounts
for 3.6 log points (approximately one tenth of the return to experience); worker quality
accounts for 12.1 log points (approximately one third of the return to experience); and,
what I am attributing to human capital, which encompasses on-the-job training, accounts
for 12.2 log points (approximately one third of the return to experience).
We can observe from Figure 1a that the returns to experience do not increase in a
linear fashion. In the first five years of experience an individual has a return to experience
of 19.8 log points. In contrast, in the 5 years leading up to the 20th year of experience
the return is 7.1 log points. This indicates that a large part of the returns to experience
are accrued in the beginning of an individuals working life. To better understand where
these different gains come from we must turn to Figure 1b. In the first five years of
experience the model shows that an individual gains 13.1 log points; approximately half
of the return to experience comes from human capital accumulation; one sixth of the
return to experience comes from the firm sorting; one tenth of the return to experience
8 The model specifications can be seen in the Appendix III.
9This comes as a result of calculating the difference of wages at 20 years of experience with that of 0
years
10Regression II of Appendix III
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comes from the job-title sorting; and one fifth of the return to experience comes from
the worker quality. In the 5 years leading up to the 20th year of experience the model
shows that an individual gains 5.4 log points; approximately one sixth of the return to
experience comes from human capital accumulation; one third of the return to experience
comes from the firm sorting; one tenth of the return to experience comes from the job-title
sorting; and half of the return to experience comes from the worker quality. These values
are summarized in the following table.
0-5 15-20
Log Point Gains % Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 13.1 100 5.4 100
Human Capital 7.1 54 0.9 15
Firm 1.9 14 1.6 29
Worker 2.9 22 2.7 50
Job-Title 1.2 9 0.4 6
Note: 0-5 columns show how the returns to experience and its components
evolve as a worker gains 5 years of experience, starting with 0 years. 15-20
columns show how the returns to experience and its components evolve
as a worker gains 5 years of experience, starting with 15 years. Log point
gains column is calculated as the difference of the values of each fixed
effect of end of period and beginning of period. % column shows the
respective percentage of each fixed effect with regards to the return on
experience. Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Table 1: Return on Experience for different time frames
What these results show is that as an individual gains experience the main driving
force that increases their wage in the first five years of their career is the knowledge they
are gaining on-the-job. This is supported by the theory of human capital accumulation
presented in section 3. However, I also show that this effect drops significantly after a
relatively short period of time (just from the first to the second year, the yearly contribu-
tion to the returns to experience shrink from three quarters to half). This goes to suggest
that most of the benefits of on-the-job learning is reaped early in an individual’s career.
Which makes sense, since more often than not, an individual starts a job with little to no
knowledge of the trade and as such increases their impact considerably in the first year
of the job. Furthermore, it makes sense to invest in human capital at the beginning of
ones working life, as this allows a larger return on investment. It is interesting to note
how the firm sorting varies in these two time frames. This increase in contribution could
be representative of some of the compensation plans employed by firms.
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5.2 Breakdown by Education
I will limit the focus to only a few education levels. As we can see from the descriptive
statistics the two levels of education with the highest shares are: 1st cycle of basic edu-
cation, 2nd cycle of basic education, and secondary education, respectively. Additionally,
it is interesting to observe college graduates, as it pertains to the most educated segment
of the population. Since 1st cycle of basic education and 2nd cycle of basic education only
differ in two extra years of education, I will focus on the less educated group. Due to
these facts, I will focus a greater part of the analysis to these three levels of education. 11
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Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Figure 2: Decomposition of Returns to Experience by Education Levels
The interpretation of the results is similar to that shown in the section above. I will
begin by presenting the return to experience of each level of education at 20 years of
experience, and its respective breakdown, shown in the following table:
11The descriptive statistics and level of education by group can be found in Appendix I
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20
1st Cycle of Basic Education Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 25.5 100
Human Capital 10.5 41
Firm 4.8 19
Worker 7.6 30
Job Title 2.6 10
Secondary Education Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 22.7 100
Human Capital 10.2 45
Firm 4.1 18
Worker 6.1 27
Job Title 2.3 10
College Graduates Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 29.6 100
Human Capital 11.0 37
Firm 5.2 17
Worker 10.1 34
Job Title 3.3 11
Note: Log point gains column corresponds to the values of
the returns to experience and its components at 20 years of
experience. % column shows the respective percentage of
each component with regards to the return on experience.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Table 2: Decomposition of Returns by Education Levels at 20 years of Experience
From this we see that college graduates have consistently higher returns than the rest,
suggesting that there is some merit to the theory of how ability plays a role on wages
(see section 3). We also see that at the 20-year mark, the percentage contributions of the
different components do not change much with respect to education levels, human capital
accounts for two fifths to half of the return to experience, the firm effect accounts for one
fifth of the return to experience, the job-title sorting accounts for a tenth of the return
to experience, and the worker quality varies between a fourth and a third of the return
to experience. This would suggest that workers of different levels of education gain from
the same sources at relatively the same experiences. This will be something that we will
analyze further when we observe the curve as a whole.
The following table summarizes the relevant values for the curve at the various edu-
cation levels, similarly to the section above.
On a level by level basis the interpretation for the results shown above do not differ
much from that of the population as a whole. The results show that as an individual
gains experience the main driving force that increases their wage in the first five years
of their career is the knowledge they are gaining on-the-job. I also show that this effect
17
0-5 15-20
1st Cycle of Basic Education Log Point Gains % Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 12.5 100 3.8 100
Human Capital 6.6 52 0.5 13
Firm 1.9 15 1.2 31
Worker 2.8 22 1.9 51
Job-Title 1.3 11 0.2 5
Secondary Education Log Point Gains % Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 12.7 100 2.9 100
Human Capital 6.6 52 0.4 14
Firm 1.9 15 1.0 33
Worker 2.9 23 1.5 50
Job-Title 1.3 11 0.1 3
College Graduates Log Point Gains % Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 13.9 100 4.2 100
Human Capital 6.7 48 0.6 14
Firm 2.2 16 1.1 27
Worker 3.5 25 2.2 53
Job-Title 1.5 11 0.3 6
Note: 0-5 columns show how the returns to experience and its components evolve
as a worker gains 5 years of experience, starting with 0 years. 15-20 columns
show how the returns to experience and its components evolve as a worker gains
5 years of experience, starting with 15 years. Log point gains column is calculated
as the difference of the values of each fixed effect of end of period and beginning
of period. % column shows the respective percentage of each fixed effect with
regards to the return on experience. Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Table 3: Return on Experience for different time frames by levels of education
drops significantly after a relatively short period of time. This suggests that most of the
benefits of on-the-job learning is reaped early in that individual’s career, and through
human capital investment. However, we know see that there is a larger decrease in the
effect of job-title sorting, on all education levels. This would suggest that the job-title
comes to play a larger role as a worker gains experience. This would suggest that as an
individual gains experience and climbs the job ladder their wage increases with them.
From the information provided so far, it would seem that workers of differing education
levels receive identical returns to experience. This is understandable as we are missing
a key piece of information, namely, how the returns fair against one another not being
normalized. The following figures will help us understand how the returns to experience
change over different education levels.
Figure 3 shows a similar image to figure 1a from the section above. However due to
the sheer amount I must separate the uncontrolled and controlled curve into two separate
figures (figure 3a and 3b respectively). One of the surprises that we can see from figure
2b is that individuals with 1st cycle of basic education have a higher relative return on
18
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(a) Returns to Experience by different levels of educa-
tion. Showing log wages on experience not controlling
for any other factor.
(b) Returns to Experience by different levels of educa-
tion. Curves normalized to zero. Showing experience
on log wages, controlling for tenure, tenure squared,
firm size, gender, education, and calendar year fixed
effects (Regression III of Appendix III) .
Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Figure 3: Returns to Experience separated by levels of education
experience than those with higher education (individual with a secondary education).
This would suggest that in the Portuguese economy, once we control for factors such
as firm, job-title, worker, and calendar fixed effects, individuals with less than or equal to
4 years of schooling receive higher returns to experience than those with less than or equal
to 12 years. However, the most educated level (college graduates) receives the highest
returns. To clarify, this goes to show that not only do college graduates fair best because
they begin their career with higher paying wages, but they also receive higher return on
the experience they gain over their life-cycle. As mentioned in section 3, this could be due
to the fact that people with the ability to learn quickly select the ultimately high-paying
jobs where much learning is required and thus put their abilities to greatest advantage.
Another interesting result that can be seen from figure 2b is the accelerated growth
of the returns for college graduates, after which it seems that the growth of all four levels
becomes quite similar. after the 10th year of experience mark it seems that all four levels
of education follow parallel growth patterns. This would indicate that the differentiation
of the education levels happens before this point, and the benefits of higher levels of
schooling is mainly felt early on in the career. From these findings and figure 2a we can
conclude that the overall difference between education levels is due to the higher starting
salary that individuals from higher education levels attain.
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5.3 Job Change
Shifting gears, I will now present how the returns to labor market experience are affected
when we take into consideration worker making job-to-job moves. I will only present the
findings for individuals with less than 7 jobs, and I define a job as the marriage of one
specific individual with a specific firm. Thus, these results will shed some light as to the
return of job mobility, and will help us shed light on to the claims made by theories in
job shopping, job matching, and sorting.
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of jobs on log wages, not controlling for any other fac-
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gender, education, and calendar year fixed effects (Re-
gression V of Appendix III)
(b) Decomposition of Returns. Gelbach decomposition
of the Conditional curve of (a). Curves normalized to
zero. Showing firm, job-title, and worker contribu-
tions to the impact of number of jobs (Regression VI
of Appendix III)
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Figure 4: Graph of Impact of the Number of Jobs and its Decomposition
From figure 4a (which has a similar reading as figure 1a) we can see that as an indi-
vidual makes job-to-job changes, their impact of the number of jobs increases. From the
shape of the overall curve we see that there seems to be some sort of diminishing returns
to the number of jobs, as the first job nets about a 6.1 log point increase to hourly wage,
while the sixth job nets a 2.4 log point increase to hourly wage. The decomposition of
said impact of the number of jobs are shown in figure 4b.
From figure 4b we can see how the impact of the number of jobs is partially driven by
firm sorting. The contributions of worker quality and job-title sorting are equal up until
the second job, where the job-title sorting seem to follow a linear growth and the worker
quality appears to increase substantially. The interpretation of job mobility effects, that
is, the impact of the number of jobs after taking sorting into account, suggests that as
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an individual changes job they are entering in a better match, and/or are obtaining a
higher salary from their new firm in order to entice the change. As mentioned, after the
third job, the effect of job mobility attenuates, becoming somewhat constant, meaning
that there returns to job mobility drop to almost zero.
With these result we have a better understanding of how wages change as an individual
changes jobs, and what are the driving factors of the wage increases. However, we are
lacking information on the role on-the-job training plays when it comes to job mobility.
For this we must turn to a different analysis. The following figure is similar to that of
figure 1, however, now I am also controlling for the number of jobs. With this added
dimension, and comparing both figures 1 and 5, it can be seen what the effect of job
mobility have on gains from experience.
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(a) Returns to Experience. Both curves normalized
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perience, not controlling for any other factors. Con-
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Figure 5: Graph of Returns to Number of Jobs and Decomposition for whole population
These figures, specifically figure 5b, gives us a richer breakdown of the 34.5 log point
return on experience that we found in section 5.1. This is to be expected as I am adding a
new variable (previously omitted), job mobility. The main change to the results found in
section 5.1 at 20 years of experience is a reduction to 8.5 log point (from 12.2 log points) for
human capital, it now accounts for approximately one fourth of the return to experience.
the newly added dimension, job mobility accounts for 4.9 log point (approximately one
tenth of the return to experience).
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0-5 15-20
Log Point Gains % Log Point Gains %
Return to Experience 13.1 100 5.4 100
Human Capital 5.2 40 0.4 7
Firm 1.7 13 1.5 28
Worker 2.9 22 2.4 48
Job-Title 1.2 9 0.3 6
Job Mobility 2.1 16 0.7 13
Note: 0-5 columns show how the returns to experience evolve and its
components as a worker gains 5 years of experience, starting with 0 years.
15-20 columns show how the returns to experience and its components
evolve as a worker gains 5 years of experience, starting with 15 years.
Log point gains column is calculated as the difference of the values of
each fixed effect of end of period and beginning of period. % column
shows the respective percentage of each fixed effect with regards to the
return on experience. Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Table 4: Return on Experience for different time frames
Comparing table 1 and the table 4 we can see that when adding this new dimension,
most of the already calculated returns suffer very minor changes. This cannot be said for
the returns of human capital, these reduce significantly, this suggests that there is quite a
bit of human capital accumulation that arrives from job changing, which falls in line with
some of the theories of human capital accumulation. From the new result we can see that
the returns from job mobility stay relatively constant, percentage wise, as an individual
gains experience. This would imply that finding a better job match has the same relative
benefits for any experience level.
6 Conclusion
I used a combination of high-dimensional fixed effects regression model, the decomposition
proposed by Gelbach (2016) on a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee data set
from the Portuguese Ministry of Labor, in order to study the underlying factors that
determine an individual’s wage change over their life-cycle, how these factors differ at
different education levels, and how they differ when a worker makes job-to-job moves.
I find that on average, the return on experience is 34.5 log points for 20 years of
experience. I break down this return into: where an individual works; what title an
individual holds; the worker’s traits; and human capital, which encompasses on-the-job
training. More specifically, I find that after 20 years of work wages increase, on average
41%. A large fraction of the returns to labor market experience is rooted in the returns
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to general training (25%) but sorting into better paying firms and job/titles is responsible
for a significant 19% and 10% of the returns to labor market experience, respectively. Job-
to-job mobility also enhances life-cycle earning (14%), as does the ability of the worker
(32%). My results also show that as an individual gains experience, the main driving
force that increases their wage in the first five years of their career is the knowledge they
are gaining on-the-job. However, I also show that this effect drops significantly after a
relatively short period of time. Furthermore, I show that a large part of the returns to
experience are accrued in the beginning of an individuals working life.
On the education front, my results indicate that the most educated workers have
consistently higher returns than the rest. However, if we look at less educated individuals,
we can observe that individuals with less than or equal to 4 years of schooling receive
higher returns to experience than those with less than or equal to 12 years. Furthermore,
I find that the differentiation of the education levels happens before the tenth year of
labor market experience, and the benefits of higher levels of schooling is mainly felt early
on in the career. On job-to-job mobility, I show that after the third job, the effect of
job mobility declines, becoming somewhat constant, meaning that there returns to job
mobility drop to almost zero.
Further research on life-cycle wages is left open after this result. Firstly, it would be
interesting to approach this subject from an age perspective, as opposed to experience.
As mentioned earlier this would run into an age-cohort-year problem in the worker fixed
effect, but applying a correct specification on age could solve this problem. This was the
approach I initially took, but quickly came to the conclusion that I would not be fruitful.
Perhaps with greater resources this approach would result in interesting findings. This
would be a research which would be interesting to see not only because of its results, but
also because it could provide further robustness to the results of this thesis.
Another possible avenue further research could use this study as a starting point
would be to flesh out some of the job mobility dimensions presented, I did not include
the plethora of complexity that this area requires, and as such am not able to pinpoint
the root of the effects of job mobility to one concrete theory (job shopping, job matching
23
or sorting). It would be interesting to see the results of such a study to see how it would
farther the knowledge of the field. Hopefully, the findings of this thesis will stimulate in
other researchers the motivation to carry this research.
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8 Appendices
Appendix I: Levels of Education Distinguished in Data Set
Level Definition
1 0 years of schooling [Illiterate]
2 Less than or equal to 4 years of schooling [1st Cycle of Basic Education]
3 Less than or equal to 6 years of schooling [2nd Cycle of Basic Education]
4 Less than or equal to 9 years of schooling [3rd Cycle of Basic Education]
5 Less than or equal to 12 years of schooling [Secondary Education]
6 Less than or equal to 14 years of schooling
7 More than 14 years of schooling [College graduate (bachelor, master or PhD)]
Source: Quadros de Pessoal
Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
I II
Labor Market Experience (years) 10.6254
(standard dev) 8.39699
Percentile 10 1
Median 9
Percentile 90 23
Mean Schooling (level) 3.783
(standard dev)
Share Schooling Level 1 1.85 1.85
Share Schooling Level 2 26.81 28.66
Share Schooling Level 3 18.74 47.4
Share Schooling Level 4 20.14 67.54
Share Schooling Level 5 19.4 86.94
Share Schooling Level 6 2.37 89.31
Share Schooling Level 7 10.69 100
Mean Number of Jobs 1.69444
(standard dev) 1.0681
Share With Number of Jobs = 1 59.08 59.08
Share With Number of Jobs = 2 23.63 82.71
Share With Number of Jobs = 3 10.32 93.03
Share With Number of Jobs = 4 4.28 97.31
Share With Number of Jobs = 5 1.68 98.99
Share With Number of Jobs = 6 0.64 99.64
Share With Number of Jobs = 7 0.23 99.87
Share With Number of Jobs = 8 0.08 99.96
Share With Number of Jobs = 9 0.03 99.99
Share With Number of Jobs ≥10 0.01 100
This table reports the summary statistics from
Quadros de Pessoal (1994-2013). Column II shows cu-
mulative percentages when available. Source: Quadros
de Pessoal
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Appendix III: Regressions
Regressions (Log) Real Hourly Wages
I II III IV V VI VII
tenure 0.0038 0.0066 0.0023 0.0068 0.0148 0.0087 0.0087
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
tenure sq. 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
firm size (in logs) 0.0654 0.0391 0.0653 0.0389 0.0648 0.0391 0.0391
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
gender (male=1) 0.2784 - 0.2776 - 0.2751 - -
(0.0004) - (0.0004) - (0.0004) - -
experience & education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
experience/education FE Yes Yes
number of jobs FE Yes Yes Yes
firm, worker, & job-title FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 38,549,942 38,549,942 38,549,942 38,549,942 38,549,942 38,549,942 38,549,942
R2 0.5056 0.8926 0.5178 0.8931 0.5086 0.8927 0.8927
Note: standard deviation (in parentheses) are calculated with worker-cluster robust standard errors. Source: Quadros de
Pessoal
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